The program of the XVI International Congress of Historical Sciences includes the topic "New phenomena in diplomacy after 1914: structure, peace support, methods". The interest in attempts to establish lasting peace and thwart them by aggressive forces in Europe and the Far East in the period between the two World Wars is not accidental. For realistic people, it is obvious that ensuring peace and security of peoples and preventing a thermonuclear war is truly the dictates of the times today. It is clear that it is important to analyze the causes of instability in the world after the First World War. Just two decades later, a second, even more devastating World War broke out. Finding out the factors of the fragility of the world in 1919-1939, as well as an objective and comprehensive disclosure of the historical experience of diplomacy in this period, can facilitate understanding of what should be done to strengthen security in modern conditions, when humanity faces the possibility of a global thermonuclear catastrophe.

This threat is now most closely related to Europe 1 . We know the primary strategic importance of this continent, its relatively small size, the concentration of huge material and cultural values on it, the heritage of civilization created over thousands of years. In Europe, large armed forces of states with different social and political systems are concentrated in close proximity to each other, with weapons of unprecedented destructive power. Both World Wars began in Europe on German soil.

The task of scientific and historical generalization of new phenomena in diplomacy and international relations between the two world wars is all the more timely because a huge number of diplomatic documents, memoirs and diaries of political figures responsible for the fate of the world at that time were published. Extensive series of documents on the foreign policy of Germany, Great Britain, France, the United States and other countries during this period have been published. In the Soviet Union published, in particular, documents on the eve of World War II from the archives of Nazi Germany. Relatively recently, the documents of the British cabinet were opened to historians, confirming the intention of the then British government to direct the aggression of nazi Germany to the east of Europe, against the Soviet Union. The multi-volume series "Documents of the Foreign Policy of the USSR"has already been completed in 1939. Thus, there is a reliable documentary basis for uncovering the causes of the instability of the world after the First World War. A lot of them appeared

1 Narochnitsky A. L. Foreign policy of the USSR and problems of European security between two world wars. - New and recent history, 1974, N 5.

page 35

publications about the causes of the Second World War, its origins and preparation. Many of the secrets of this training were exposed in the materials of the Nuremberg and Tokyo trials of the main German and Japanese war criminals.

Soviet scientists have long developed and continue to deepen and refine a scientifically based point of view on the main features and course of development of international relations and diplomacy in 1917-1939, the causes and nature of the First and Second World Wars, on the facts and processes that strengthened or undermined the foundations of security and peace at that time. Many special generalizing works have been created .2 Diplomacy before World War II is also covered in Soviet studies on military history3 . Many books by Western historians on post-World War I diplomacy have also appeared in recent decades .4 Despite the one-sidedness of many concepts, and in some cases a direct distortion of the past, especially Soviet foreign policy, a number of works of Western scientists contain extensive and valuable factual material, many important observations and specific conclusions.

The new features of the diplomacy of capitalist states between the two world wars, as always, were closely intertwined with previous traditions and aspirations. It would be wrong to focus on the evolution of the techniques and forms of diplomatic relations, even though their history is worth studying. Soviet historians seek to uncover the underlying causes of social development, rooted in the positions of various classes, the dominant socio-political forces, and the motives that determined their behavior during the outbreak of World War II. The works of Soviet scientists consistently reveal the real forces of aggression and reaction in the face of the ruling circles of the fascist powers of Europe and militaristic Japan, who sought war, as well as capitalist states that encouraged aggression. It turns out that there was no fatal inevitability of the Second World War, that it could have been prevented by strengthening collective security, as well as with the help of more far-sighted and not blinded by hatred of socialism diplomacy of the Western powers.

As shown in the works of Soviet scientists, the nature of international relations and diplomacy in different epochs follows from the fundamental features and contradictory trends of their time. Antiquity, the Middle Ages with feudal systems, and modern times with their triumph of capitalist relations had their own characteristics of international politics and diplomacy .5 So it was in the period between the two world Wars.

2 History of Diplomacy, vol. III. Moscow, 1965; International Relations in the Far East. Book 2. 1917-1945. Moscow, 1973; Leninist traditions of foreign policy of the Soviet Union. Moscow, 1977; Sixty years of the USSR's struggle for peace and security. Moscow, 1979; Europe in International Relations 1917 - 1939. Moscow, 1979; History of foreign policy of the USSR. Tt. 1-2. Moscow, 1983; Fomin V. T. Aggression of fascist Germany in Europe. 1933-1939. Moscow, 1963; Khvostov V. M. Problems of the history of foreign policy of the USSR and international relations. Selected Works, Moscow, 1976; Sipols V. Ya. Soviet Union in the struggle for peace and Security. 1933-1939. Moscow, 1974; his. Diplomatic struggle on the eve of the Second World War, Moscow, 1979.

3 History of the Second World War 1939-1945. Vol. 2, 12. Moscow, 1974, 1982; et al.

4 Baumont E. Le faillite de la paix 1918 - 1939. Tt. 1 - 2. P. 1951; ejusd. Les origines de la deuxieme guerre rnondiale. P., 1969; The Diplomats 1919 - 1939. Princeton, 1953; Renouvin P. Histoire des relations Internationales. T. VII (1914 - 1929); t. VIII (1929 - 1945). P., 1957 - 1958; Tylor A. J. The Origines of the Second World War. Hammondsworth, 1969; Middlemas K. Diplomacy of Illusion. The British Government and Germany. 1937 - 1939. Lnd., 1972; Duroselle J. B. Histoire diplomatique de 1919 a nos jours. P., 1978; Poidevin P. L'Allemagne et le monde au XX-me siecle. P., 1983.

5 See: History of Diplomacy. Tt. I-V. M., 1959-1974; Narochnitsky A. L. On the theory and methodology of the history of international relations. - Voprosy istorii, 1976, N 2.

page 36

The causes of the First World War were rooted in the struggle of the strongest imperialist Powers for the redivision of the world .6 This struggle continued after the First World War. At the same time, since 1917, a fundamentally new force has emerged - as a result of the socialist revolution, a new world has been born in Russia. The main and above all new features of diplomacy and international relations between the two world wars stemmed from this fundamental change in the course of world history.

In 1917, many politicians in the capitalist world considered the revolution in Russia an accidental phenomenon and predicted that the Bolsheviks would hardly hold on to power even for a few weeks. It took the U.S. Government a decade and a half to realize the need to establish diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. But now it is no longer possible to seriously dispute the fact that the beginning of modern history and the only characteristic feature of the entire world historical process and international relations after 1917 was the division of the world into socialist and capitalist systems as a result of the victory of the October Revolution and the formation of the world's first socialist state. After only a quarter of a century, it was able to destroy the main forces of the German Wehrmacht and thus make a decisive contribution to the victory over Nazi aggression in World War II.

The first foreign policy act of the Soviet state on the world stage, Lenin's Decree on Peace of October 26 (November 8), 1917, was addressed to all belligerent peoples and their Governments. It reflected the main directions of Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy developed by V. I. Lenin: getting out of the world imperialist war, fighting for a just democratic world, peaceful coexistence with capitalist countries, international solidarity with the international labor movement, supporting the national liberation struggle of peoples, and defending the socialist Fatherland.

Lenin's concept of peaceful coexistence was based on deeply thought-out historical, theoretical, and political considerations. As early as 1915, Lenin came to the conclusion that the victory of socialism was possible initially in a single country, 7 and provided for a long period of its co-existence with the capitalist states. He pursued this course in 1917 and constantly followed it, standing at the head of the Soviet state, in particular at the conclusion of the Brest Peace. Although Lenin naturally wanted the victory of the socialist revolution in Germany and other European countries, he always considered the possibility that this would not happen yet, and already at the time of the Brest Peace, he prevailed over the adventurist line of the Trotskyists and "left communists".8
Like K. Marx and F. Engels 9, Lenin was always against "exporting the revolution" to other countries. He wrote that revolutions are not made to order, are not timed to a particular moment, but mature in the process of historical development and occur at a time determined by a complex of internal and external causes .10 That Lenin had in mind peaceful coexistence and competition with the capitalist States is evident from the Soviet Government's desire to establish good-neighborly relations with the surrounding States as quickly as possible. Already in 1917-1919, the Soviet government tried to restore and establish economic ties

6 See Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 27, pp. 299-426.

7 Ibid., vol. 26, pp. 351-355.

8 Minutes of the Central Committee of the RSDLP (b). August 1917-February 1918, Moscow, 1958.

9 K. Marx and F. Engels Soch. Vol. 35, p. 298.

10 See Lenin V. I. PSS. Vol. 36, p. 531.

page 37

with capitalist states, especially neutral ones, such as Sweden and Denmark 11 . In an interview with McBride, the American correspondent of the Christian Science Monitor, in September 1919, Lenin spoke of "the coexistence of socialist and capitalist countries." 12 Attempts by bourgeois historians, including the English historian E. Carr, to attribute to the Soviet government the desire to "export the revolution" in 1917-1920. 13 are completely untenable. The establishment of peaceful relations with the capitalist countries was temporarily delayed by imperialist intervention and blockade, as well as by their policy of non-recognition of the Soviet State.

The young Soviet Republic immediately paved new paths in the development of diplomacy and international relations. From the very first steps of its existence, it published and rejected the secret agreements of the tsarist government with its allies on the conduct of the imperialist war, the planned annexations and spheres of influence. It faced sabotage and treason by tsarist diplomatic officials, attracted new personnel to diplomatic work, and established a simpler system of diplomatic posts. A whole galaxy of gifted diplomats of the Lenin school came forward. The brilliantly educated G. V. Chicherin, who came from a noble family and became a revolutionary, devoted all his efforts to serving the foreign policy of the young socialist state, to formalizing and establishing its diplomatic relations with the outside world. M. M. Litvinov, a former professional Bolshevik revolutionary, went down in history by associating his name with a number of treaties of the Soviet Union with the Soviet Union. other countries on non-aggression and the struggle for collective security in the 30s.

The Soviet state renounced all of Russia's unequal treaties with its eastern neighbors, maintaining peaceful and good-neighborly relations with them. It recognized the right to independence of Finland and Poland, proclaimed equality and the right to self-determination of all peoples, which objectively contributed to the rise of national liberation movements around the world.

Soviet foreign policy and diplomacy were fundamentally opposed to the policy of tsarist Russia and other capitalist states in their peaceful socialist nature and negative attitude to conquest. At the same time, the Soviet State inherited historical, including contractual, rights to its territories. After the socialist Revolution, the peoples of the Land of Soviets became the subjects of these rights. Socialist ownership was also extended to foreign capital invested in Russia. At the Genoa Conference of 1922, on Lenin's instructions, G. V. Chicherin defended the concept of equal coexistence in international relations of two property systems - the socialist and capitalist-which was a practical application and an integral element of the principle of peaceful coexistence of States with different social systems.

The voluntary unification of most of the peoples of Russia into the Soviet Union in 1922 was an event of great significance .14 It greatly contributed to the building of socialism in one country and strengthened the influence of the Soviet state on international relations

11 Shishkin V. A. The Soviet State and the countries of the West in 1917-1923. Essay on the history of the formation of economic relations, L. 1969.

12 Christian Science Monitor, 17. III. 1919; Letters to V. I. Lenin from Abroad, Moscow, 1969, pp. 401-406.

13 Carr E. H. A History of Soviet Russia. The Bolshevik Revolution 1917 - 1923. Vol. III. Lnd., 1953.

14 See the USSR in the struggle for peace and Security of Peoples. Historical experience, Moscow, 1984.

page 38

and diplomacy. Then came the "recognition period" and the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union by many states. With the success of socialist industrialization and the growth of the USSR's defense power, the role of socialist diplomacy on the world stage rapidly increased. Its most important feature was to defend the ideas of disarmament, peace and security, solidarity with the international labor movement and the national liberation struggle of peoples. At that time, the Soviet Union was the only socialist power that was surrounded by developed capitalist countries that had not yet freed themselves from semi-colonial dependence.

The previously established traditional forms and methods of diplomacy of the great and small capitalist States continued to prevail in the vast and immensely powerful capitalist world. But even there, important changes have taken place; they have created a new environment and created new challenges for diplomacy. The defeat of Germany and its allies and the collapse of Austria-Hungary led to the strengthening of the positions of the leading victorious states in the international arena-England, France, the United States, Italy and Japan, which had a decisive influence on the creation of the post-war Versailles and Washington treaty system. The United States has become the citadel of capitalism's industrial and financial power in the West. Western Europe was dominated by England and France. The whole complex of relations between the capitalist states has changed, and they have been complicated by new mutual disagreements. Diplomatic negotiations and treaty acts were sharply affected by the contradictions between the victorious states and the defeated Germany, as well as between the winners themselves - England and the United States, France and England, the United States and Japan.

The global nature of the war and the growing interconnectedness of Europe and other continents of the world have given rise to many new aspects of diplomacy. After 1918, its new features can be considered, in particular, the huge increase in the role of multilateral negotiations and treaty acts, the unprecedented scale of the Paris Peace Conference, which far surpassed the diplomatic congresses of the XIX century. A system of post-war treaties was developed, the purpose of which was to consolidate in favor of the winners a new redistribution of the world and the balance of power between the leading capitalist powers.

The end of the First World War was accompanied by the formation of new states in Europe and the formation of their own foreign policy and diplomacy. At the same time, they became the object of a struggle for influence and inclusion in regional groupings under the auspices of the leading powers of the capitalist world.

The mandate system for the former German colonies and a number of other countries has created new problems in diplomatic negotiations, in particular in connection with anti-colonial liberation movements. The victorious Powers, by means of mandates, wanted to extend, if possible, the existence, at least in a reduced form, of the colonial dependence of a number of countries. National liberation uprisings and wars led to the fact that the leaders of these movements and the revolutionary authorities that emerged during them tried to deploy their diplomacy, which has not yet been studied by historians.

The elimination of a number of monarchies with the political dominance of the nobility and the consolidation of the power of the big bourgeoisie and its political parties also caused new trends in the development of diplomacy. In the capitalist states of Europe, the diplomatic service has ceased to be the traditional occupation of aristocrats. In the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, officials from the "middle classes" began to appear. The same thing happened in Weimar Germany and in Great Britain. In bourgeois republics and constitutional monarchies by ministers

page 39

More and more often, the foreign ministers were not professional diplomats, but parliamentary and party leaders, and the political course of these countries could fluctuate depending on the party affiliation of these people. In England, after D. Lloyd George, conservative and Labor governments were replaced. Such a figure, for example, appeared in the diplomatic arena as the Labor leader A. Henderson, who took up the post of Foreign Minister in 1929. It was the same in France, where the leaders of the right, radical socialists and socialists at different times decided foreign policy affairs, although, as is known, neither A. Poincare, nor E. Herriot, nor L. Blum were professional diplomats.

But the Ministries of Foreign Affairs maintained a sort of caste of professional diplomats consisting of diplomatic officials. She was the bearer of continuity and routine, a balance between the influence of the leaders of bourgeois parties, played the role of coordinator and skilled technical designer of diplomatic documents and contacts. In this regard, the importance of leading, rarely replaced responsible officials of diplomatic departments was preserved and even strengthened .15 There was antagonism and frequent conflicts between professional diplomats and party leaders .16
The struggle of political parties, debates in parliaments and the need for parliamentary approval for many political acts, debates in the committees of chambers often hindered the adoption of rapid foreign policy decisions or led to certain changes in the political course. Of course, parliamentary debates, debates in commissions, and newspaper polemics contributed to a certain increase in the publicity of the foreign policy of bourgeois governments, but many negotiations and agreements remained secret. The number of various declarations and promises made by bourgeois Governments in the sphere of foreign policy, often demagogic and hypocritical, has multiplied. The discontent of large sections of the population, who bore all the costs of war and economic crises, the revolutionary upsurges, the growth of the workers ' and communist movements, and distrust of official diplomacy prompted monopoly capital to increase its influence on the press and expand its ability to manipulate public opinion through it. The democratic forces had much less opportunities to do this.

Advances in technology, especially radio and telegraph communication, also left a new imprint on diplomacy, regardless of the differences in the social and political structure of States. The "great embassies" of the eighteenth and early twentieth centuries, with enormous powers and great freedom to do important things far from their capitals, have gone into the distant past. The personal responsibility and role of diplomatic representatives was further reduced, because they were instantly informed by radio and telegraph of the instructions of their Governments and had to send them their messages. With the expansion of day-to-day international relations, the staff and structure of diplomatic departments, embassies and consulates grew and became more complex. Specialized services and institutions, expert groups, and various commissions and committees were increasingly involved in political and economic decision-making. In diplomacy, the direct role of heads of government and states has increased, but not yet

15 In France, in 1920, the post of Permanent Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was established, which was held for a long time by Fr. Skewer, and then-A. Leger. There were similar figures in the British diplomatic department. In 1920, the Office of the Reich Minister was established in the German Foreign Policy Department, which centralized the management of the most important affairs.

16 Thus, in 1922, Poincare removed F. Vertelot from business for almost three years for too unceremonious complicity with the Chinese Industrial Bank, and only Herriot returned him to his former duties in 1925.

page 40

Rarely has the importance of foreign ministers and their departments been weakened.

The growth in the number of diplomatic missions and the development of their daily activities began to give them more and more common features, which was facilitated by the abolition of many monarchies and the spread of republican rule. There has been a simplification of the representative procedure, ceremonial, and titulature. Lush uniforms began to appear less and less often. The idea of ambassadors and envoys as personal representatives of the monarch was gradually becoming a thing of the past.

Although some new features of diplomacy sometimes did not depend on the social system, but arose due to the general expansion of international relations and the success of technology, in its content and goals, the diplomacy of the capitalist world not only preserved, but even more fully manifested its class socio-political image. It served even more than before the interests of big capital, which united in powerful monopolies, sought to consolidate the balance of power in the international arena in favor of the leading capitalist powers, preserve and expand access to sources of raw materials and energy, especially oil, and markets for goods and capital exports, and took care to establish spheres of domination, or "open markets". doors", regional or global hegemony. The diplomacy of the victorious Powers served to consolidate the results of the First World War in their interests. Then preparations for a new redivision of the world and the Second World War began, and broad diplomatic activity also developed in this direction.

Due to the economic crises and reparations, negotiations on financial and economic issues have become very important. Ultimately, they resulted in the collapse of the reparations system, the revival and financial encouragement of Germany's economic expansion and armaments. The diplomacy of the leading capitalist Powers promoted the expansion of big capital in every possible way .17
At the same time, in the diplomacy of capitalist countries, explanations of diplomatic actions by "national interests", concern for "preserving peace", "freedom and independence"remained traditional. Sometimes this was more or less true. Thus, it can hardly be disputed that L. Barthou really cared about the national security interests of France, speaking out against the strengthening of Hitler's Germany, that Kemal Ataturk defended Turkey's national interests against encroachments by Western powers on its territory and sovereignty, etc. But behind the words about "national interests", "protection of peace" and " independence of peoples"much more often there were other goals-the suppression of revolutions and national liberation movements, aggression or its encouragement, ensuring the benefits of capitalist oil and other trusts, arms concerns, banks, etc.

As the official American "commentary" to the "14 points" showed, behind the lush democratic phraseology of US President W. Wilson, there were plans for the dismemberment of Soviet Russia .18 Daladier and Bonnet motivated their course towards an agreement with the Nazi Party.

17 Gromyko A. A. External expansion of capital. Istoriya i sovremennost ' [History and Modernity], Moscow, 1982; Martin D. Bratstvo biznesa [Brotherhood of Business]. Monopolies of the USA and Germany, Moscow, 1951; Pozdeyeva L. V. England and the remilitarization of Germany. 1933-1936. Moscow, 1956; Baskin V. S. Oil monopolies in the Near and Middle East. Moscow, 1957; see also: Castillon R. Les reparations allemandes 1919 - 1932, 1945 - 1952. P., 1953; Fischer P. Bundnis der Eliten. Zur Kontinuitat der Machtstrukturen in Deutschiand. 1871 - 1941. Dusseldorf, 1979. The American historian W. A. Williams emphasized that the main motives of US foreign policy in the twentieth century were determined by the dominant economic groups that sought to expand American rule (Williams W. A. The Tragedy of American Diplomacy. N.Y., 1959).

18 Colonel House's Archive, vol. IV, ch. VI.

page 41

Germany's "defense of France's own national interests"19 , although in reality they were pursuing policies that weakened France. Even P. Laval, who was later executed as a traitor, referred to "national interests". The Cabinet of N. Chamberlain called the" preservation of peace " line of agreement with Hitler in order to direct the aggression of fascist Germany from England to the East, ultimately against the USSR, i.e. the course of encouraging aggression and unleashing war in Eastern Europe in the hope of a peace agreement with Germany. Even Hitler, committing acts of aggression one after another, each time promised peace, which did not prevent him from immediately making new demands.

The diplomacy of the capitalist Powers became increasingly motivated by the struggle against revolution. Beginning in 1917, its clearly anti-socialist course was outlined. Already in the summer of 1917, plans were being made in England, France, and the United States for far-reaching economic penetration into Russia and support for the Russian counterrevolution. The governments of capitalist countries did not believe in the viability of Soviet power. They intervened under the pretext of restoring the Russian front of the First World War. Soviet scientists have irrefutably proved that the real goal was not to take care of the Eastern Front, but to overthrow Soviet power and destroy Bolshevism. The intervention unfolded in the summer of 1918, when the defeat of the central power bloc was already a foregone conclusion, and President W. Wilson himself recognized it as useless from the point of view of waging war .20 After the armistice of November 11, 1918, the intervention continued. Moreover, Germany was involved: the last clause of the armistice stipulated that its troops would remain in the occupied territories of Russia to fight against Bolshevism .21 It is known that in the Baltic provinces of Russia in 1917-1918. the Soviet government won, but it was overthrown by German troops. Only with the help of Western capitalist States were their dependent governments established there for two decades .22
At the Paris Peace Conference, either explicitly or covertly, the "Russian question"was also of considerable importance. Measures to rein in Germany were relaxed in order to maintain a bulwark against Bolshevik Russia .23 In the course of the intervention, various plans were made to replace Russia with a number of weak states that were more or less dependent on the great capitalist powers of the West .24
Just as interventions against the revolutions of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were carried out by the nobility-monarchist diplomacy and the Holy Alliance of the last century created by it, the diplomatic preparation of counter-revolutionary interventions against the socialist and people's democratic revolutions has become a feature of the diplomacy of the capitalist world of modern times. But both before and now, attempts to stop the progressive course of history in this way have been and remain ultimately unsuccessful.

And after the "streak of recognition" and the establishment of diplomatic and trade relations with the Soviet Union by many countries, the ruler-

19 Telegram of the plenipotentiary representative of the USSR in France to the NKID of the USSR of October 29, 1938 In the collection: USSR in the struggle for peace on the eve of the Second World War, Moscow, 1971, p. 64 (hereinafter-USSR in the struggle for peace).

20 Memorial to the Ambassadors of the Allied Powers, July 17, 1918.

21 Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations (PRFR) of US. Vol. II. Washington., 1932, pp. 287 - 290; Narotchnitski A. L. La Russie et l'Europe en 1918. - Revue d'histoire modern et contemporaine, P., 1969, Janvier - mars.

Behind the Scenes of Foreign Intervention in Latvia, Moscow, 1959.

23 Shtein B. E. Russkiy vopros na Parizhskoi mirnoy konferentsii (1919-1920) [The Russian Question at the Paris Peace Conference (1919-1920)]. Moscow, 1949.

24 It is enough to recall at least the discussion of this issue during the negotiations for the Princes ' Islands conference.

page 42

The governments of bourgeois states repeatedly returned to attempts to discriminate against him, supported counter-revolutionary emigration, and tried, though unsuccessfully, to resort to methods of diplomatic and economic pressure. Capitalist powers have tried many times to solve their problems at the expense of the Soviet Union. This was the case, for example, in the development of the Dawes Plan. The Locarno Agreements left borders in eastern Europe out of the guarantee system, etc., etc.

Most of the diplomats of the capitalist world did not understand the inner strength and vitality of the Soviet Socialist state, its peacefulness and negative attitude to conquest. They did not want to see the independent origins of the communist and national liberation movements in those countries where they developed due to internal reasons, explaining them as "Moscow's machinations", thus trying to divert attention from their own expansionist plans. This has contributed to maintaining a climate of distrust and instability in the world. Blind faith in the "prophecies" of the counter-revolutionary emigration about the supposedly imminent and imminent collapse of socialism also had a harmful effect on the situation at that time. The ruling circles of the Western powers did not spare money to pay the embittered and incapable of objective judgments of imaginary "experts" of the Soviet Union, who incited distrust of its policies. Repeated initiatives of the USSR in favor of disarmament were rejected as "Bolshevik propaganda", although the Soviet state proceeded in this case from its real interest in peace for the sake of building socialism.

Perhaps the most important feature of the diplomacy of the capitalist countries in 1919-1939 was the inefficiency and weakness of the means it used in the face of the rapid growth of forces that soon turned to preparing for a new war. International relations during this period were characterized by instability, fragility and extreme fragility of post-war peace and security treaties, especially in Europe and the Far East.

After the First World War, the role of international governmental organizations in the diplomacy of the capitalist Powers increased. The most important of these was the League of Nations. After the US refused to join it, it was used mainly by Britain, France, and Italy to consolidate the results of the victory over Germany and the isolation of the Soviet Union. The League of Nations did not gain global significance and could not stop the fascist aggression. In 1933, Japan and Germany defiantly withdrew from it. The significance of the USSR's entry into the League of Nations (1934) was weakened by the policy of encouraging aggressors pursued by the Western powers-Britain, France, and the United States.

Forms and methods of preserving peace based on the results of the First World War proved ineffective. They were primarily limited to the limitation of German armaments, including the demilitarization of the Rhineland, guarantee pacts (the Locarno Treaties), regional blocs under the auspices of the victorious Western powers (the Lesser Entente, the Balkan Pact, etc.). Verbal recommendations and" sanctions " of the League of Nations did not stop the preparations for war and the aggression of the fascist powers due to the connivance of sides of England and France. Mutual aid pacts between the USSR, France, and Czechoslovakia could have been of great importance, but they were nullified by the Munich policy of encouraging the aggressor.

The post-war treaties of the capitalist Powers immediately gave rise to attempts to revise them. Since 1919, the main task of German diplomacy in the near future has been the revision of the Versailles Peace Treaty. But this was only the first stage, and after it, especially with the rise to power of fascism in Italy and Germany, far-reaching plans for the redistribution of Europe and the colonies, the creation of a vast zone of " novo-

page 43

First of all, in Central and Eastern Europe. Therefore, the attempts of bourgeois authors to reduce the aims of German fascism to a revision of the Versailles decrees are completely untenable.

The failure of the reparative policy gave rise to a large influx of capital from Britain and the United States to Germany, which helped the rapid economic and military revival of German imperialism .25 It was also made easier by the fact that the German economy suffered relatively little in the First World War26 .

At the same time, the aggressiveness of fascist Italy was increasing in Europe, and Japan launched its aggression in East Asia. These Powers sought territorial conquests to seize resources and markets, to expand their areas of domination and to achieve world hegemony. These goals were covered by the banner of the struggle against communism (the Anti-Comintern Pact). The anti-Soviet demagoguery reflected both the hatred of the leaders of this pact for socialism and their policy of blinding the diplomacy of the Western powers, which they initially managed to do.

German fascism brought new developments to diplomacy. Hitler and his other leaders proclaimed the misanthropic doctrine of racism, claims to the alleged exclusivity and superiority of Germans over other peoples, the" right " of Germany to conquer "living space" by any means, and called for the destruction of the Soviet Union and Bolshevism. Fascism introduced into diplomacy and international relations a fanatical belief in its vocation to rule the world, a claim to the "right" to exterminate, enslave, and outlaw other peoples. Fascist "jurists" even put forward the thesis that the Soviet Union generally stands outside the sphere of international law and cannot be its subject.

Once in power, the Nazis limited the influence of professional diplomats. A special "Ribbentrop bureau" infiltrated the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and soon concentrated the most important affairs in its hands, the press department of the Foreign Ministry came under the control of Goebbels. The leading role in fascist diplomacy was assigned to individuals involved in sabotage, espionage and murder. Any means were widely used - lies, deception, treachery, threats and terror. A complete rejection of all legal and moral restrictions in the choice of means to achieve the goal was made a principle. Seeing the acquiescence of the Western powers, Hitler abandoned diplomatic etiquette. During the negotiations, he shouted insults, interrupted and did not listen to the interlocutors, yelled, and the translators imitated him, transmitting his words.

After the rearmament of Germany, France, Britain and the states bordering the Soviet Union could not resist the aggressor without the support of the Soviet Army. The only sure way to curb fascist aggression was the policy of collective security, which the USSR insisted on. But the hatred of the propertied classes of the Western powers for socialism and their ingrained prejudices about the goals of Soviet foreign policy led to the fact that the rulers of Britain and France saw in the fascist states a barrier against the spread of social revolution and thought first of all of directing German aggression to the East .27 They were guided not by the principles of peace and democracy, but by the ideas of anti-Sovietism .28 Halifax told Hitler that Germany was "a bulwark against Bolshevism." Conser-

25 Istoriya vtoroi mirovoi voyny 1939-1945 [History of the Second World War 1939-1945], vol. 1, Moscow, 1973, pp. 20, 169.

26 Poidevin P. Op. cit.

27 Matveev V. A. The failure of the Munich policy (1938-1939), Moscow, 1955, pp. 126-127, et al. Das Munchener Abkommen 1938. Stuttgart, 1958, S. 440.

28 The USSR in the struggle for Peace, p. 655, et al.

page 44

it was therefore "difficult for the conservative cabinet to negotiate an agreement with communist Russia"29 . Chamberlain told the Italian Ambassador in London, D. Grandi, that Germany is a "raging bull" and "the point is not to put it in a cage, which would be impossible, but to direct it to another goal." 30 According to the Soviet envoy to England, I. M. Maisky, Chamberlain was obsessed with pushing Germany against the Soviet Union. 31 A. Cadogan wrote in his diary that the prime minister "would rather resign than sign an alliance with the Soviets." 32 Bonnet hoped that Nazi Germany would direct its aggression to the East "against Bolshevism." 33
As you know, Austria and Czechoslovakia were the first victims of fascist aggression and the course of the Western powers to encourage it. During the Munich Conference in September 1938, it was still possible to stop Hitler by joint efforts, but the governments of the Western Powers conspired with him to dismember Czechoslovakia. The Soviet Union was ready to provide her with military assistance if her Government decided to resist German demands and made such a request .34 The Soviet government sent word to Warsaw that it would terminate the non-aggression pact with Poland without warning if its troops entered Czechoslovakia.

After the Munich agreement, the Polish ambassador in London wrote that, according to the prevailing opinion in England, Chamberlain "defended the English goal and thus moved the game to the East of Europe." 35 In an effort to deflect the aggression of nazi Germany and direct it to Central and Eastern Europe, the Governments of Britain and France did not confine themselves to the Munich agreement on the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia. September 30, 1938 was followed by the signing of the Anglo-German declaration on the desire of the peoples of both countries never to fight with each other again. On December 6, the Franco-German declaration on the recognition of the existing borders between the two States and mutual consultations in case of international difficulties was signed. In fact, it was a declaration of non-aggression. By signing it, Hitler wanted at least the tacit approval of the Western powers to grant him a free hand in the East. There is no doubt that the French government had the same idea in mind. As subsequent events have shown, this policy of Western governments was a serious miscalculation.

According to the English historian Wheeler-Bennett, Chamberlain hoped that Germany would use up its forces in the Russian steppes at Bor-

29 The Diplomatic Diaries of Oliver Harvey 1937 - 1940. Lnd., 1970, pp. 289 - 290.

30 Filatov G. S. The Collapse of Italian fascism, Moscow, 1973, p. 101; Sipols V. Ya. Soviet Union in the struggle for Peace, p. 175, 281, 318-319.

31 Maisky I. M. Memoirs of the Soviet Ambassador. Book 2. Moscow, 1964, p. 432.

32 The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938 - 1945. Lnd., 1971, p. 182.

33 Reynaud P. La France a souve l'Europe. Vol. I. P., 1947, p. 575; USSR in the struggle for peace, p. 661.

34 History of Diplomacy, vol. III, pp. 737-738; New Materials on Munich, Moscow, 1957. Hitler's plan "Grun" took into account the possibility of the Soviet Union providing assistance to Czechoslovakia, in particular by the air force (ADAP, ser. D. Bd. II, S. 281-283; USSR in the struggle for peace, p. 655). Romania could not prevent the passage of Soviet aircraft. Its government was inclined to tacitly allow this to happen (see Les relations germano-sovietiques, 1933 - 1939, P., 1954, p. 78). In terms of the number of combat aircraft, England and France were twice as large as Germany at that time (Adamtwait A. France and her Coming of the Second World War, 1936-1939. Lnd., 1977, pp. 381, 403-408). Field Marshals General Keitel and General Manstein believed that if it had come to military action at that time, Germany would not have been able to defend itself successfully. The Rise and FaM of the Third Reich. Lnd., 1973).

35 USSR in the struggle for Peace, p. 129; Documents and materials on the eve of the Second World War, vol. I. M., 1948, pp. 344-356.

page 45

a be that would exhaust both sides 36 . Western governments also hoped that Japan would attack the Soviet Union. The American historian F. Schuman concluded that, in the opinion of these governments, "giving the fascist troika free hands" would lead to a German-Japanese attack on the USSR, and then "civilization would be protected from Bolshevism", and France, England and the United States "would be able to remain neutral until fascism and communism were destroyed." each other " 37 .

The Soviet leadership understood the essence of the"policy of non-interference". The Central Committee's Report to the XVIII Party Congress on March 10, 1939, emphasized that this policy was intended "not to prevent, say, Japan from getting involved in a war with China, or even better with the Soviet Union, not to prevent, say, Germany from getting bogged down in European affairs, getting involved in a war with the Soviet Union, and to give everyone a chance to the participants in the war should sink deep into the mire of war, encourage them to do so on the sly, let them weaken and exhaust each other, and then, when they are sufficiently weakened, come out on the stage with fresh forces, speak, of course, "in the interests of peace", and dictate their terms to the weakened participants in the war. " 38 Recent publications have fully confirmed this analysis.

Chamberlain hoped that the Fascist aggression would pass through England. On December 14, 1938, he told a government meeting that, in his opinion, "Hitler's next action will be directed to the East, and in this case we could stay out of the war altogether." 39 Despite the alarming information coming from Berlin, and the beginning of clarity in the minds of a number of British politicians, 40 the Prime minister's blindness did not leave. The British and French governments proceeded from a completely false understanding of the situation, inspired by blind anti-Sovietism. The British cabinet disparaged the armed forces of the Soviet Union-almost 10 times lower than their actual strength-while Hitler's general staff considered them enormous .41 Meanwhile, the U.S.S.R. was too strong for Hitler to attack it without first gaining dominance in Western Europe. In March 1939, his immediate tasks included the capture of Czechoslovakia and Poland, and then the defeat of France and even England, and perhaps the United States. The war against the USSR was clearly conceived as the last and decisive stage of German aggression .42 In March 1939, Hitler threatened the total annihilation of Czechoslovakia and forced its then rulers to commit an act of national treachery - to "consent" to its inclusion in the Fascist Reich. At the beginning of April 1939, he set the date of the attack on Poland - September 1. The German-Italian "steel pact" of May 22, 1939, was clearly aimed first at:

The Soviet Union in the Struggle for Peace, p. 263. The English historian A. Taylor was forced to admit that the inspirers of the Munich Agreement "undeservedly appropriated to themselves the glory of peacemakers" (Taylor A. The War Lords. Lnd., 1979, p. 29).

37 Shuman F. L. Soviet Politics. At Home and Abroud. N. Y., 1947, p. 282.

38 XVIII Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (b) March 10 - 21, 1939. Stenogr. otch. Moscow, 1939, p. 13.

39 Middiemas K. Op. cit., p. 427. A. Taylor also notes the desire of the "Munich people" to divert the war from England to the East, for which they had to pay a high price (Taylor A. Munich. The Price of Pence. Garden City, 1979, pp. 128, 1004; see also: Zhilin P. A., Yanushevsky A. S., Kulakov E. N. Criticism of the main directions of bourgeois historiography of the Second World War. Moscow, 1983).

40 Borisov Yu. V. Soviet-French relations (1924-1945), Moscow, 1964, p. 428-429; Popov V. I. Diplomatic relations between the USSR and England (1929-1939), Moscow, 1965, p. 411.

41 Sipols V. Ya. Soviet Union in the struggle for peace, pp. 309, 393; Feiling K. The Life of Neville Chamberlain. Lnd., 1946, p. 403.

42 Bullitt's report outlining Hitler's speech of March 8, 1939 to the highest fascist leaders. - USSR in the struggle for peace, pp. 224-225; Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1939. Vol. I. Washington, 1956, pp. 672 - 673.

page 46

total against France and England 43 . Growing alarm in the West and attacks in England on cabinet policy in late March forced Chamberlain to promise Poland guarantees, but in the most vague terms. The Soviet government, not without reason, interpreted this as a way to suggest to Hitler the way to attack the Soviet Union, bypassing Poland-through the Baltic States in the direction of the northeast, where the "guarantees" did not apply .45
Some Western historians, seeing it absolutely impossible to deny that the British and French governments wanted to direct fascist aggression to the East, ultimately against the USSR, try to argue that the Soviet Union also sought only to turn the tip of Hitler's aggression to the West. They argue that "collective security" was just a "phrase", and both sides equally wanted "a hurricane of fascist aggression not to go their way" .46 However, this was not the case in reality. The Soviet Government, in a note to the German Ambassador, immediately denounced the seizure of Czechoslovakia as an act of aggression that dealt a blow to the security of the peoples. As early as March 18, 1939, Litvinov sent through the British ambassador in Moscow a proposal to immediately convene an international conference with the participation of the USSR, Britain, France, Poland, Romania, and Turkey47 for urgent consultations, but the Western powers did not even agree to this. Chamberlain wanted to"buy time" 48 and followed the previous goal of reaching a "broad agreement" with Germany at the expense of Eastern European countries. On April 17, 1939, the Soviet Union invited Britain and France to conclude an agreement on mutual assistance against aggression against any of the contracting countries and on assistance to the Eastern European states located between the Baltic and Black Seas along the borders of the USSR. 49 But the Western powers did not want an agreement based on mutual and equal security, and they did not want an alliance with the USSR .50
The history of the failure of the Western powers to negotiate mutual assistance is now so well known that it is not necessary to describe it in detail. First, the Soviet Union was asked to accept guarantees without any obligations on the part of the Western Powers. They also wanted to avoid the condition that a separate peace should not be concluded in the event of war with Germany .52 The stumbling block was the unwillingness of the British and French Governments to extend their mutual assistance obligations in the event of possible aggression against the Baltic States. The negotiations, which lasted for 75 days, yielded no results .53 The absurdity of this position later forced the British and French cabinets to agree that their guarantees should also apply to the Baltic countries, but

43 Fomin V. T. Uk. soch.

44 According to Simon, the British government feared that it might be overthrown by "its own people" if it advocated "any peace" (Langer W. Z., Gleason S.E. The Challenge to Isolation, 1937-1940. N.Y., 1952, p. 252).

45 USSR in the struggle for Peace, p. 303.

46 Roberts H. L. Maxim Litvinov. In: The Diplomats 1919 - 1939, p. 376.

47 USSR in the struggle for Peace, pp. 242-243.

48 Feiling K. Op. cit., pp. 401 - 402.

49 The USSR in the Struggle for Peace, pp. 336-337.

50 Only the French ambassador in Moscow and later in Berlin, R. Coulondre, spoke in favor of this alliance. Even Western historians admit that it was" the voice of one crying in the wilderness " (Ford F. L., Schroske C. E. The Voice in the Wilderness: Robert Coulondre. The Diplomats, 1919 - 1939, pp. 560, 564).

51 History of Diplomacy, vol. III, p. 777 p.; Sipols V. Ya. Soviet Union in the struggle for peace.

52 Sipols V. Ya. Soviet Union in the struggle for Peace, p. 310; Colvin I. The Chamberlain Cabinet. Lnd., 1971, p. 209.

53 Pravda, 29. VII. 1939.

page 47

only in the case of direct aggression. Britain and France avoided the most likely possibility of Hitler's Germany seizing these countries through indirect aggression, 54 as happened with Czechoslovakia, i.e., they left loopholes for evading their commitments. 55
False is the version that the USSR sought the consent of the Western powers to occupy the Baltic states with their troops .56 In fact, the Soviet Government proposed that Soviet warships should be temporarily stationed in the ports of these countries, along with British and French warships. But Halifax ordered the British ambassador to reject Soviet proposals to conclude a military convention and define indirect aggression .57 The British cabinet was only looking for ways to delay and disrupt the negotiations, which is also confirmed by recently declassified archives .58
It was only at the end of July that the British government sent a military delegation to Moscow, and even then it consisted of minor officials. She was instructed to negotiate "very slowly" and not to involve England "in any detailed commitments".59 . It was not until August 17, 1939, that instructions were finally sent to accept the Soviet proposals for the definition of indirect aggression, but they were not even used, as it turned out that both delegations of the Western Powers did not have the instructions and authority to conclude a military convention at all .60 The question of the passage of the Soviet Army through the territory of Poland and Rumania to contact the German troops also met with resolute resistance from the Polish and Rumanian bourgeois-landowner governments, with the tacit support of Chamberlain and Halifax .61 Meanwhile, the Soviet delegation headed by the People's Commissar of Defense of the USSR K. E. Voroshilov presented both its powers and a specific plan of action in case of aggression.

What was the reason for this position of the Western powers? From an entry in Chamberlain's diary dated July 30, it is clear that the main goal of the British cabinet remained an agreement with Germany, and not with the Soviet Union .62 In June-August 1939, Chamberlain's adviser held talks in London with an official close to Goering. Volta on the possibility of publishing a declaration of "non - use of force", i.e. non-aggression, between the two countries on the conditions of non-interference of Germany in the affairs of the British Empire. It also referred to the transfer of former German colonies and some other territories to Hitler's Reich .63 Labour MP R. Buxton sent a proposal to Berlin through one of the German diplomats that Britain should recognize Eastern Europe as "the natural living space of Germany, and Germany should recognize the natural living space of England" as the British Empire. In other words, Hitler was once again offered free rein against Poland, the USSR, and other Eastern European states. On August 26, Chamberlain stated at a meeting of his

54 British papers published: DBFP, ser. III, Vol. VI, pp. 229 - 230, 277, 308.

55 Sipols V. Ya. Secret diplomacy. Riga, 1968.

56 See, in particular, Langer W. L., Gleason S.E. Op. cit., p. III.

57 DBFP, ser. Ill, Vol. VI, pp. 311, 328, 335 - 336.

58 Chikvaidze A.D. English Cabinet on the eve of the Second World War. Tbilisi, 1976.

59 DBFP, ser. III, Vol. VI, pp. 763 - 764

60 Ostoya-Ovsyanyi I. D. New information about the Anglo-Franco-Soviet negotiations in Moscow. - New and recent history, 1971, N 1, p. 54-57.

61 When Halifax learned of the Soviet government's request for Poland's position, he went to play cricket for the weekend, while Chamberlain went fishing.

62 Sipols V. Ya. Diplomatic struggle on the eve of the Second World War, p. 250.

63 USSR in the Struggle for Peace, pp. 509-512; History of Diplomacy, vol. III, p. 689.

page 48

governments: "The main point is that if Britain leaves Herr Hitler alone in his sphere, he will leave us alone." 64
As for Poland, the Western governments were not going to fight a war over it. In the event of a "broad agreement" with Germany, the fate of Czechoslovakia was prepared for it. On August 22, Halifax conveyed a message to Henderson for Hitler's information, expressing Britain's readiness to negotiate on controversial issues between Germany and Poland and on "broader issues concerning the future of international relations, including subjects of interest to us and you." 65 The US Ambassador in London, J. R. R. Tolkien. Kennedy wrote that Poland should be left to its fate, since after its capture, Hitler's Germany would start a war against the USSR, "to the great benefit of the entire Western world." The same opinion was expressed by the American Ambassador in Paris, W. Bullitt, and the US Ambassador in Berlin, H. Wilson .66 Meanwhile, according to the testimony of Ribbentrop's representative in Hitler's Hevel headquarters, in the event of an alliance between the USSR and the Western powers, Hitler would have considered himself forced to abandon an attack on Poland .67
The desire of the Western governments to avoid an alliance with the USSR was clear to Hitler from the reports of the German ambassadors. There is no doubt that only the failure of British and French politicians ' hopes for an agreement with Germany and the fear of public outrage in their own countries forced England and France to declare war on Germany after its attack on Poland, but, as we know, this turned out to be just a "strange war". It was conducted not in the hope of saving Poland, but in the hope that Hitler's Germany would still attack the USSR.

Only when the Soviet Government was convinced that it was completely impossible to conclude an alliance with Britain and France did it decide to conclude a non-aggression pact with Germany. Although Ribbentrop insisted on coming to Moscow as soon as possible, the Soviet government agreed to this only after exhausting all possible negotiations with the Western powers. At the same time, it took into account that the capture of Poland by Nazi Germany and the possible occupation of the Baltic states by it would bring the Hitlerite armies almost close to Leningrad and Minsk.

In the Far East, as early as 1938, Soviet troops had to repel a Japanese attack on Soviet territory near Khasan Island, and in August 1939, Soviet and Mongolian troops defeated the Japanese invaders who had invaded the borders of the Mongolian People's Republic, which was friendly to the Soviet Union. An agreement has already been reached between Germany and Japan to recognize Japan's "right" to expand up to Lake Baikal and Germany's right to expand "up to the Caucasus."68 A war on two fronts with complete foreign policy isolation created a huge danger for the USSR.

The conclusion of the non-aggression pact with Germany on August 23, 1939, was a necessary but far-sighted and only possible step to preserve peace on the borders of the Soviet Union. It prevented, for a certain time, not only the war with Germany, but also the invasion of the Soviet Union.-

64 Sipols V. Ya. Soviet Union in the Struggle for Peace, p. 411; see also: ADAP, Bd. VI, p. 81-82.

65 DBFP, ser. III, Vol. VII, pp. 127 - 128.

66 Sipols V. Ya. Soviet Union in the Struggle for Peace, pp. 298, 345; Langer W. L., Gleason S.E. Op. cit., p. 76; Wilson H. R. A Gareer Diplomat. N.Y., 1960.

67 Sipols V. Ya. Soviet Union in the struggle for Peace, p. 393; Kordt E. Nicht aus den Akten. Stuttgart, 1950, S. 310.

68 Kutakov L. N. Istoriya sovetsko-yaponskikh diplomaticheskikh otnoshenii [History of Soviet-Japanese diplomatic relations], Moscow, 1962, p. 189; Rodov B. V. Rol ' SSHA i Jap'noi v razvitianii voiny na Tikhikh okeane v 1938-1941 gg., Moscow, 1951; Narochnitskiy A. L. Reactionary American literature on the Far Eastern policy of the United States (1938-1945 gg.). - Voprosy stories, 1954, N 4.

page 49

falling from Japan. By concluding this treaty, the USSR did not violate any guarantee obligations and did not betray any allies. As W. Foster wrote, he took this step only after he was convinced of the futility of negotiations with England and France .69 The Soviet Union bought time to strengthen its defenses and subsequently managed to push its borders to the west, which also played an important role in the impending war with Nazi Germany. Only after its defeat of Poland, whose government rejected Soviet aid, did the USSR move the Soviet Army to protect the population of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus. As a result of the victory of the socialist revolutions in 1940, the Soviet Baltic republics were formed and became part of the USSR. If the Soviet government had remained an indifferent witness to Hitler's aggression and even then had not put certain obstacles to it by its actions (including diplomatic ones!), the Wehrmacht would have launched an invasion of the USSR from the borders that were only 30 and 60 km away from Leningrad and Minsk. The far-sighted measures of the Soviet government helped him during the Great Patriotic War not only to stop the fascist offensive on Moscow, but also to thwart Hitler's plans for a "blitzkrieg", to make a decisive contribution to the defeat of the Nazi Wehrmacht and to the liberation of Europe from Fascist barbarism.

Thus, in the twists and turns of the diplomatic struggle that preceded the outbreak of World War II, two lines are clearly traced. On the one hand, this is the policy of the Soviet state, aimed at ensuring peace by creating a system of collective security, on the other hand, it is the policy of the Western powers, designed to encourage the aggression of fascist states, striving at all costs to channel it against the USSR.

The historical experience of interwar diplomacy allows us to draw important conclusions.

The diplomacy of the Western powers and Japan usually put forward the false thesis that Soviet foreign policy follows the course of artificially imposing socialist, national liberation and democratic revolutions on other countries ("exporting the revolution"). This view of the capitalist Powers had a negative impact on the international situation and contributed to the weakening of the foundations of peace and security. Unwillingness to see the internal origins of revolutions in various countries, underestimation of the powerful vitality of socialism and its success led Western diplomacy to major political and military miscalculations. The experience of history shows the short-sightedness and failure of the" Munich " course of the Western powers to encourage fascist aggression, as well as the complete blindness of the reactionary governments of Eastern European states that did not want to pursue a policy of collective security with the participation of the USSR. Their illusions about the "guarantees" of the Western Powers have completely collapsed. The Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence and collective security on the basis of equal and mutual obligations provided real opportunities in the 1930s to curb fascist aggression and prevent World War II, but the Western powers disrupted negotiations on a military alliance against Hitler's Germany. False anti-Soviet stereotypes ingrained in the minds of Western leaders contributed to this, which shows the danger of this kind of self-blindness.

Anti-communist demagoguery was widely used by fascist states to mask their claims to world domination. The history of the interwar period proves the danger of creating aggressive military blocs. The results of World War II are thunderstorms-

69 Foster W. Essay on the Political History of America, Moscow, 1953, p. 601.

page 50

It is a clear warning against any attempt to gain world domination under the false visor of the struggle against communism. The history of the interwar period and the Second World War confirms that one of the main sources of military danger is the racist, nationalist ideology of fascism, and warns against attempts to revive it in any form, as well as against reviving revanchist tendencies.

The experience of 1917-1939 proves that the genuine consolidation of peace and security in Europe and throughout the world is impossible without equal peaceful coexistence and cooperation between the U.S.S.R. and the capitalist Powers, based on equal security and mutual benefit. The successful joint participation of the states of the anti-Hitler coalition in World War II confirmed the possibility of such cooperation between the United States, France and Britain, as well as other capitalist countries with the Soviet Union. The decisive role of the USSR in achieving victory, its contribution to the liberation of Europe from fascism and to the post-war peace settlement testified to the growing importance of the foreign policy of a socialist power for protecting the independence of peoples, strengthening security and peace, preserving the achievements of world civilization, and preventing new, even more devastating wars in modern conditions.

page 51

Permanent link to this publication: