W. RUGE. Das Ende von Weimar. Monopolkapital und Hitler. Dietz Verlag. Berlin. 1983. 360 S.

Professor of the Central Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences of the GDR V. Ruge, who recently died, was a well-known expert on the history of Germany in 1918-1933. His latest book is devoted to questions: who and why nurtured German fascism, destroyed the Weimar Republic. In contrast to bourgeois historiography, which considers fascism outside of class relations, V. Ruge showed it as a product of imperialism, as the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie in its worst form.

The instability of capitalism in Germany after the First World War and the November Revolution prompted the monopolistic bourgeoisie to look for ways and means to strengthen its rule. Its attention was drawn to fascist organizations that aimed to prevent the workers from adopting the position of scientific socialism and to use the revolutionary energy in the interests of counter-revolution with the help of national and social phraseology and the demagogy of so-called national and popular socialism (p.31).

The author focuses on the connection of monopoly capital with the Nazi party of Hitler, who, having got into one of the fascist organizations as a Reichswehr spy, gradually moved to the first role in it. There were ebbs and flows of sympathy for Hitler on the part of the bourgeoisie. His unsuccessful debut on November 9, 1923, when he went straight ahead to seize power by force in Munich, was perceived by many as an inability to assess the situation, after which a period of disillusionment with the Fuhrer began in the circles of the big bourgeoisie, but the movement itself was considered necessary (p.100).

In the development of relations between the Nazi Party and monopolies, W. Ruge explored two interrelated lines: the constant adaptation of fascism to the needs of monopolies and the steady movement of German monopoly capital towards military dictatorship. Even the first Nazis - E. Stadtler, A. Drexler and others-put their organizations at the disposal of monopoly capital and the military. Through such extreme reactionaries as E. Ludendorff, the monarchist E. Reventlov, and Admiral L. Schroeder, they established connections with the leaders of German industry. The monopolists were impressed by the methods of Fascist propaganda, their demagoguery, and the fact that the Nazis, while infinitely despising the masses, simultaneously appealed to them and flirted with them. For their part, the fascists assured the monopolists that no other right-wing radical party, other than the NSDAP, would be able to carry out their program (p.142).

Much of the book focuses on the early links between the Nazis and monopolies. Already in 1921-1922, E. Borzet, K.-F. Siemens, G. Strznnes and other industrial magnates actively supported the Nazi movement. Special relations were established between the fascists and those who advocated armament and war, and played an influential role in the formation of the ger-

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May politics (G. Krupp, K. Haniel, F. Thyssen, P. Kleckner, etc.).

The main idea that permeates the book is the gradual mutual rapprochement of fascism and monopolies on an anti-people platform, the transformation of the Nazi movement into an instrument of monopoly domination. The author brings the reader to the conclusions that directly follow from the development of this process: the closer the fascists ' ties with the monopolies became, the less pseudo-socialism was observed in their statements to the masses. Even the pseudo-socialist slogans that the Hitlerites used as bait frightened the bourgeoisie, who were afraid that the working people would take them as a signal for action (p. 34, 177). Thus, in 1928, the industrial magnate E. Kirdorf left the NSDAP in order to force its leadership to abandon hostile statements against monopolies (pp. 139-140).

The materials presented in the book show that fascism grew up as a mercenary of monopolies and was not capable of independent existence (p. 73). It was their comprehensive support that made this movement widespread (p. 146). The book gives many examples of the financing of the Nazis by both German and foreign monopolies, especially American ones (pp. 76, 148, 239,314).

Having studied the degree of influence of fascist propaganda on the masses, the author concluded that the majority of workers remained immune to it even during the economic crisis of 1929-1933 (p. 164). At the same time, the petty-bourgeois, chauvinistic masses, stunned by the magnitude of the crisis and their losses in it, followed the anti-monopoly slogans of the Hitlerites and formed their temporary and unreliable base. The author's attention to Hitler is quite justified. Among the leaders of the Nazi Party, he was able, like no one else, to assure his patrons of his ability to curb the masses, and the masses of their desire for good.

V. Ruge exposed the legend of bourgeois historiography about the alleged left group of G. Strasser in the Nazi Party, who, while engaged in fascist propaganda in the industrial regions of Germany, was more often forced to resort to demagogy than other Hitler's henchmen. If there were any groups in the NSDAP, it was mainly in connection with the struggle for power. There were no left-wing groups in the fascist movement. On the contrary, the first Nazi organizations were already seeking friendship with the anti - Communists, joining hands with the most extreme reaction-the Kapp and pan-Germans, who saw in the tactics of the fascists an opportunity to enlist "popular confidence" in order to establish a military dictatorship (p.38).

The author thoroughly investigated the reasons that contributed to the rise of the Nazis to power, and above all, the policy of the right-wing leadership of German social democracy. At the crucial moment, the SPD, with its erroneous assessment of fascism as a petty-bourgeois movement (p.83), which had risen in the wake of the economic crisis, abandoned the united anti-fascist front with the Communists for fear of a proletarian revolution, and as a result found itself isolated. Her position as an outsider stimulated the growth of fascism (p. 156). This was precisely the result of the conformist impotence of the SPD leadership, another capitulation to the monopolistic bourgeoisie, which this time turned out tragically for Social democracy itself.

Much attention is paid to the anti-fascist activities of German Communists. The KKE, always ready to fight fascism together with other workers ' parties and organizations (p. 276), called on the Social-Democrats to unite. If, as V. Ruge notes, the SPD, taking advantage of the collapse of the reactionary Harzburg front in 1931, had agreed to unite with the Communists and both workers ' parties had put up a common candidate in the 1932 presidential election, he would have won (p.235). The decision of the right-wing leaders of social democracy to vote for P. Hindenburg was a rejection of an independent position in the struggle against fascism (p. 234). There are many other examples in the book of missed opportunities for social democracy to block Hitler's path to power, leaving the Communists alone against the Nazis, their patrons, active and passive helpers.

Most of the book (the last three chapters out of six) is devoted to the study of the union of monopolies and fascism during the global economic crisis, the process of establishing the Hitler dictatorship in Germany. In those years, it was no longer individual groups, but the entire bourgeoisie and Junkers who pushed the Nazis to power, and many bourgeois ress.-

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the Publicans defected to the camp of the enemies of the Weimar Republic (p. 155). The period from the September 1930 elections to the July 1932 elections is estimated in the book as the period of the greatest successes of the Hitlerites, which is explained by the protest of the masses, especially the youth, against the capitalist system and by the fact that after September 1930 monopolies finally made" a bet on Hitler (pp. 191-198). The right-wing bloc, led by the Nazis, began to form in a hurry.

The July 1932 Reichstag elections are rightly considered in the paper as the apogee of the NSDAP's parliamentary achievements, after which the fascist movement, having exhausted the possibilities of growth, stopped. In this turn of events, the monopolies saw a threat to the "Bolshevization of Germany", because they were afraid that the supporters of the fascists, realizing the falsity of Nazi propaganda and disillusioned with the Social Democrats, would go over to the Communists, and began to force the transfer of power to Hitler (pp. 269-270).

The coup in Prussia on July 20, 1932, was not only a breakdown of the forces of the fascists, but also a probing of the position of the SPD. The inaction of the leadership of this party strengthened the confidence of Hitler and his patrons in the successful repetition of the" dress rehearsal " of 1923 on a national scale. Already in November 1932, at the behest of the monopolies, the right-wing nationalist parties expressed their support for the Fuhrer (p. 294). His monarchist ways appealed to the junkers, especially after he assured them of the inviolability of land holdings (pp. 201-202).

An important point, the author emphasizes, was the powerful pressure of industrial and financial circles on Giadenburg in order to force him to appoint Hitler to the post of Reich Chancellor (p. 296). The President was also under pressure from fascist Reichswehr officers, who even intended to arrest him if he delayed his appointment (p.324). In the end, Hindenburg agreed to transfer power to the "Bohemian corporal". The reader will find in the book a lot of facts about the Reichswehr's involvement in the struggle for future influence in the system of the fascist dictatorship, about the help of the Reichswehr Minister Karl Schleicher to the Nazis.

Using the logic of facts and arguments, the study reveals the failure of bourgeois historiography's attempts to " whitewash Hitler and the Nazi Party, hide the links between fascists and monopolies that formed the spring of the NSDAP's movement to power, and deny the huge monetary assistance to Hitler from the monopoly funds.

The book is well illustrated. Its source base consists of published documents, archival materials, and works by historians of the GDR, USSR, and Germany. The content and conclusions of the author are of practical value in the modern struggle of progressive humanity against imperialism, neo-fascism and the threat of war.

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